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The effects of aging population on the sustainability of 
fiscal policy 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 26/2005 
Mikko Puhakka 




We study the effects of aging population on the sustainability of fiscal policy in 
overlapping generations models with government debt and a pay-as-you-go 
pension system. The smaller the population growth rate, the lower the maximum 
sustainable level of deficits. When the utility function is of a specific form, an 
increase in the payroll tax rate and the replacement rate decreases the level of 
maximum sustainable deficits; except in the case when pension depends on the 
wage level prevailing during the working period. The ratio of the deficits in two 
economies with different population growth rates is characterized with numerical 
examples. 
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Väestön ikääntymisen vaikutuksia finanssipolitiikan 
kestävyyteen 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 26/2005 
Mikko Puhakka 




Tutkin tässä työssä väestön ikääntymisen vaikutuksia talouden tasapainon kanssa 
sopusoinnussa (kestävyys) olevaan finanssipolitiikkaan yksinkertaisissa limittäis-
ten sukupolvien malleissa, joissa eläkkeet määräytyvät jakojärjestelmän mukaan. 
Primääristen budjettivajeiden suurin kestävä määrä on sitä pienempi, mitä 
vähäisempi on väestön kasvuvauhti. Kun taloudenpitäjien hyötyfunktio on erityis-
tä muotoa ja kun eläkkeet määräytyvät eläkkeelläoloperiodin palkkojen mukaan, 
eläkkeet rahoittavan veroasteen ja korvausasteen nosto supistaa tasapainon kanssa 
sopusoinnussa olevien maksimivajeiden määrää. Luonnehdin numeroesimerkkien 
avulla väestön kasvuvauhdiltaan toisistaan eroavien talouksien vajeiden suhdetta. 
Kommentoin lyhyesti myös verojen vaikutusta työn tarjontaan ja verotulojen mää-
räytymiseen. Tutkimustulokset kyseenalaistavat sen, voidaanko ikääntymisestä 
mahdollisesti seuraavat ongelmat ratkaista korottamalla veroja ja lisäämällä 
julkisia menoja. 
 
Avainsanat: limittäisten sukupolvien talous, finanssipolitiikan kestävyys, jako-
järjestelmä, korvausaste 
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The demographic structures of many European and Western countries are 
changing substantially. IMF (May 2001) reports that the elderly dependency ratios 
in the Euro area are forecasted to double during the next fifty years. This is due to 
low fertility and longer expected lifetimes in these countries. The significant aging 
of population will put a lot of pressure especially on publicly funded pension 
systems and health care costs. 
  The aging of the population and the slowdown in the population growth rates 
will have a substantial effect on fiscal policy. The same IMF report (2001, p. 107) 
forecasts the long-term development of the primary budget deficits and the debt of 
the European Union, Japan and the United States. The levels of these deficits and 
debts are predicted to be the highest in about 2050. According to that forecast the 
same happens for the health care expenditures. There will be pressure for 
governments to run larger deficits because of these expenditures and the growing 
pay-as-you-go pensions. 
  Given these fundamental changes expected to occur in these countries and 
elsewhere it is important to understand their implications for fiscal policy. And in 
particular, it is an important question to ask, if these policies are sustainable, ie 
consistent with equilibrium. In addition these changes will have an impact on 
welfare and intertemporal allocation. 
  We use fairly simple two-period overlapping generations (OG) models with 
government debt and pay-as-you-go pension systems to study the effects of aging 
on the sustainability of fiscal policy. Pension systems we study include a 
straightforward pay-as-you-go system and the one, where pension depends on 
income (replacement). Replacement is important, since it is a part of many 
existing pension plans. It is interesting to note that replacement rates in many 
Western countries have risen since the 1930’s as Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, 
p. 40) report. We characterize those policies (primary deficits without pension 
costs and the level of debts) which are consistent with equilibrium. In particular, 
this characterization includes finding out what happens to the maximum level of 
sustainable deficits, when population ages. In most of the formal analyses the 
technique of the reflected generational offer curves developed by Cass, Okuno 
and Zilcha (1979) are utilized. Since the emphasis in this study is on the 
sustainability of deficits under the population aging we refrain from political 
economy considerations.
1 
  In a rather general model a drop in the growth rate of population decreases the 
maximum level of sustainable deficits. With specific functional forms an increase 
in the payroll tax rate and the replacement rate decreases the level of maximum 
                                                 
1 For an interesting political economy OG model with population growth, see Boldrin and 
Rustchini (2000). For a survey see Galasso and Profeta (2002).  
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sustainable deficits. An increase in the replacement rate does not, however, have 
any effect on equilibrium, if pension depends on the income prevailing in the 
working period. This type of replacement rule has been studied in OG models by 
Abel (2003) and in a slightly different manner by Diamond (1997). Their 
emphasis has not, however, been in the effects of the changes in population 
growth. If on the other hand pension depends on the wage prevailing in the 
retirement period an increase in the replacement rate lowers the maximum 
sustainable deficits. This type of replacement rule has been studied by Bohn 
(1999, 2002) and Cooley and Soares (1996). 
  We also provide more precise and quantitative information especially on the 
ratio of maximum sustainable deficits in two economies with different population 
growth rates. In the simplest specification of the model with pay-as-you-go 
system the ratio of the maximum sustainable deficits of these two economies is 
directly proportional to the ratio of the population growth rates. Including 
replacement makes the comparison a bit more complex, since the ratio depends 
also on the replacement rate. In the more general version of the model with linear 
utility in consumption and logarithmic utility for leisure the ratio without 
replacement is very small, and with replacement a little bit less than one. 
  Finally we comment on the possibility of increasing tax rates to generate more 
tax revenues. In the general specification of the model we show that if the tax rate 
exceeds one third the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the tax rate is 
greater than unity. This, in particular, means that raising tax rate leads to lower 
government revenues. 
  In a related literature Masson (1985), Nielsen (1992), Chalk (2000) and 
Rankin and Roffia (2003) study the sustainability of deficits and debt. They all 
use OG models with capital, but their emphasis is not on the effects of aging on 
the maximum levels of deficits and debt. 
 
 
2  The model and individual behavior 
I consider a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with population 
growth. Producer-consumers consume when young and old and produce only in 
youth. The person born at t has the following additively separable lifetime utility 
function 
 








i c  denotes consumption of person born at the beginning of time period t in 
period i (= 1,2), and ht labor supply in youth. 
1 ) 1 (
− ρ + = β , where ρ is the rate of  
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time preference. Labor is transformed to output, yt, in a linear fashion, ie  t t h y = . 
u(c) is an increasing strictly concave function, and v(h) an increasing strictly 
convex function. L denotes the upper bound for the available time. Furthermore, I 
first make the following assumptions:  +∞ =
→
) c ( ' u lim
0 c




,  0 ) h ( ' v lim
0 h =
→  
and  +∞ =
→
) h ( ' v lim
L h
. Later on some of these assumptions are relaxed. 
  Consumer can save in the private asset with the gross return R  or in 
government’s debt instrument with the return Rt+1. The private asset is a storage 
technology (or investment), which yields a certain gross return, and which can 
also be interpreted as a private social security system. A representative 






1 h ) 1 ( k s c τ − τ − = + +  (2.2i) 
 
1 t t t 1 t
t
2 k R s R c + + π + + =  (2.2ii)
2 
 
st is investment in government debt and kt in storage. 
p τ  is the social security tax 
rate and 
y τ  the income tax rate during period t. We use the notation and make a 
natural assumption  1
p y < τ + τ = τ .  1 t+ π  is the pension consumer receives in 
retirement. I assume that he takes this pension parametrically in his decision 
making. The proceeds of the social security tax are used for pension payments for 
the old. Fiscal policy is specified more precisely below. 
  Consumer does not invest anything in government bond if  R R 1 t < + . When 
R R 1 t > + , he does not invest anything in the private asset. In this case the first-
order conditions (dropping the time subscripts for a moment) will be 
 
[] 0 ) h ( ' v s h ) 1 ( ' u ) 1 ( = − − τ − τ −  (2.3i) 
 
[] 0 ) Rs ( ' u R s h ) 1 ( ' u = π + β + − τ − −  (2.3ii) 
 
We can solve the labor supply and saving from here, and then consumptions from 
the budget constraints. We denote the optimal saving function by  ) , ; R ( s π τ . The 








β + τ − −
τ − − − τ −
=
) c ( ' ' u R ) c ( ' ' u ) c ( ' ' u ) 1 (









                                                 
2 Cass and Yaari (1966) considered a storage technology in an OG model as did also Wallace 
(1980).  
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to be negative semi-definite. In addition to the concavity assumptions this requires 
the following condition, which, because of concavity, also holds 
 
[ ] 0 ) c ( ' ' u ) c ( ' ' u ) 1 ( R ) c ( ' ' u ) c ( ' ' u ) h ( ' ' v H 2 1
2 2
2 1 > β τ − + + − ≡ ∆ =  (2.5) 
 
The dependence of labor supply and saving on the interest factor will crucially 
depend on the elasticity of the second period marginal utility with respect to 
consumption (or the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion). They are both 
increasing functions of the interest factor, if that measure, σ(c2), where 
c2(= Rs + π) is less than unity. From now on I assume that σ(c2) < 1. And this will 
indeed mean that sR(R;τ,π) > 0. This is an important assumption also for dynamic 
analysis, since without this assumption there can be cycles and chaotic behavior. 
Because my emphasis is on the sustainability of deficits I maintain this 




3  Public sector’s budget constraint, fiscal policy 
and pensions 
Government’s fiscal policy, F, is defined as a sequence of expenditures and taxes 
F = {gt, τ
p, τ
y}. gt denotes expenditures (excluding expenditures on pensions) per 
young. Below we will also use the term deficit, when discussing the role of gt. 
The aggregate budget constraint in real terms is 
 
1 t t t t B ) r 1 ( D B − + + =  (3.1) 
 
where Bt denotes the aggregate public debt at the end of the period, Dt the deficit 
and rt the real rate of interest.
3 The gross population growth rate is assumed to be 
n > 0. Thus there are n
t young and n
t-1 old people around in period t. I define 
bt = Bt/n
t and dt = Dt/n








d b − + =  (3.2) 
 
The primary deficit can then be defined as 
 
                                                 
3 We could have specified a separate budget (trust fund) for pension costs, but that would not have 










t h n h n n g n d n D τ − τ − π + = ≡
−  (3.3) 
 












τ − τ −
π
+ = ≡  (3.4) 
 













g b − + τ − τ −
π
+ =  (3.5) 
 
For example a pure pay-as-you-go pension system is the one, where  t
p
t h nτ = π . 









h g b − + τ − =  (3.6) 
 
I consider other pension systems more precisely below. It is worth re-emphasizing 
that g includes other government expenditures except interest on public debt and 
expenditures due to public pension systems. Eg costs related to health care, which 
are included in g, are expected to rise significantly, when population ages. In the 
following analysis a lot of emphasis is put on understanding the limits of these 
expenditures in an aging economy. Expenditures, which are not consistent with 
equilibrium, are not sustainable. 
 
 
4  Equilibrium in a general model with pure pay-
as-you-go pensions 
The asset market equilibrium condition is bt = st. I characterize the equilibrium 
sequences of public debt by using consumer’s first-order conditions. 
  Using consumer’s budget constraints, the optimum choices, and the asset 
market equilibrium condition the first-order condition (2.3i) can be re-written as 
an equilibrium condition 
 
[] 0 ) h ( ' v b h ) 1 ( ' u ) 1 ( t t t = − − τ − τ −  (4.1) 
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which yields a contemporaneous relation between today’s labor supply and the 
level of government debt. This relation is denoted by h(bt). Totally differentiating 





) h ( ' ' v b h ) 1 ( ' ' u ) 1 (








− − τ − τ −
− τ − τ −
=  (4.2) 
 
For future reference note that  . 1 db / dh ) 1 ( t t < τ −  If bt = 0, there is a positive labor 
supply (denoted by h(0)), which fulfills (4.1), because of the Inada conditions. 
  I use this relation, the asset market equilibrium condition, bt = st, and the 
interest factor from government’s budget constraint (3.6) in the second first-order 
condition (2.3ii) above to derive the equilibrium evolution of the debt as follows 
 
[]
[] [ ] ) b ( h n )) b ( h g b ( n ' u ) b ( h g b n









+ + + + + τ + τ + − β τ + −
= − τ −
 (4.3) 
 
I define the primary deficit as  ) b ( h g d 1 t
y
t + τ − =  and the following functions 
 
[] b ) b ( h ) 1 ( ' bu ) b ( A − τ − ≡  and  [ ] [ ] ) b ( h n ) d b ( n ' u d b n ) d , b ( B
p τ + − β − ≡  (4.4) 
 
Now for any constant sequence of deficits equilibrium debt is a sequence, which 
fulfills the difference equation 
 
) d , b ( B ) b ( A 1 t t + =  (4.5)
4 
 
Many details of this model are rather well known so perhaps here it suffices to 
gather some basic facts, although below I’ll do a more detailed analysis of 
dynamics, when population is aging. 
  I assume that we are dealing with the Samuelson case (for terminology, see 
Gale, 1973) here, which means that we need to assume that 
 
[] [ ] ) 0 ( h n ' u n ) 0 ( h ) 1 ( ' u
p τ β < τ −  (4.6) 
 
Due to our assumptions both functions are increasing in debt. When deficit is 
zero, the steady state equilibrium is determined from  [ ]= − τ − b ) b ( h ) 1 ( ' u  
[ ] ) b ( h n nb ' u n
p τ + β . Given the Inada conditions and the Samuelson case it is 
                                                 
4 This is exactly the way that Brock and Scheinkman (1980) do their analysis.  
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straightforward to see that the steady state is unique, since the left-hand side of the 
steady state equation is increasing and the right-hand side decreasing in b.
5 
  Now I will analyze the dynamics in more detail. Given our assumptions 
particularly on the curvature of the second period utility function, one can see that 
the curve B(b,  d) shifts down, when the level of deficits or government 
expenditures (g) is increased. This also means that there is a maximum level of 
expenditures (denoted by g) consistent with equilibrium. Thus g  is the maximum 
sustainable level of expenditures. The corresponding level of the steady state debt 
is denoted by b. It is also well known that with positive, but not too large, 
primary deficits, there are usually two steady states at least in pure exchange 
economies with homogenous population.
6 The dynamics are described in Figure 
1, where the steady state levels of debt for some level of deficits less than the 
















What happens to the maximum level of expenditures, when the population growth 
slows down? First we note that a decrease in population growth rate, n, shifts the 
curve, B(b,  d), downwards. Suppose that we are originally at the equilibrium, 
where the maximum level of government expenditures corresponding to n is g. 
Since B(b,  d) has shifted downwards because of a decrease in the population 
growth rate, we need to further decrease expenditures to restore equilibrium, and 
                                                 
5 Azariadis (1993) characterizes equilibrium dynamics of an exchange economy with debt and 
deficits; see especially his chapter 19. 
6 This is basically known since Bailey (1956).  
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shift that curve upwards. Thus we have shown that other government 
expenditures, excluding pension costs, will have to decrease, when population 
growth rate drops. 
  To get more precise information about the effects of aging we will now turn 
to specific examples. They are still rather general, since in these examples there 
are also two steady state equilibria for many fiscal policies. 
 
 
5  The sustainability of the fiscal policy 
To get more intuition about the sustainability I will first consider a simple 







2 h ) 2 / 1 ( c ) h , c ( U − β =  (5.1)
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t h ) 1 ( s τ − τ − =  (5.2i) 
 
1 t t 1 t
t
2 s R c + + π + =  (5.2ii) 
 
The optimum labor supply is  ) 1 ( R h 1 t t τ − β = +  and saving 
2
1 t t ) 1 ( R s τ − β = + . The 
real after tax wage (here  ) 1 ( R 1 t τ − + ) elasticity is unity. It is interesting to note that 
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the total tax rate is  ) 1 /( τ − τ , which is 
greater than unity for any tax rate exceeding one half. 
  The asset market equilibrium condition requires that st = bt. We characterize 
the equilibrium sequences of public debt by using the reflected generational offer 
curve techniques of Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1979). Using consumer’s budget 
constraints, the optimum choices, and the asset market equilibrium condition we 




























=  (5.3) 
 
Since from the optimum labor supply and the asset market equilibrium condition 
we can solve for the interest factor as 
 
                                                 










we end up with the following expression (indeed this is the reflected generational 






















−  (5.5) 
 
Figure 2 describes this curve. We compute the maximum sustainable expenditures 
from the following steady state expression for (5.5) 
 
0 ng ) 1 ( nb ) 1 )( 1 ( b
2 p 2 = β τ − + β τ − τ − −  (5.6) 
 
Solving the quadratic equation for the roots we get 
 




2 2 2 2 2 p p τ − β − β τ − τ − ± β τ − τ − =  (5.7) 
 
It can be seen that real solutions exist for all government expenditures such that 
 
0 g ) 1 ( n 4 n ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 2 p ≥ τ − β − β τ − τ −  (5.8) 
 



































Thus the maximum sustainable government expenditures (again denoted by g) 
are  4 / n ) 1 ( g
2 p β τ − = . 
  We conclude that g  is smaller the smaller is the population growth rate. And 
furthermore, the higher the social security tax the lower the level of the maximum 
sustainable government expenditure consistent with equilibrium. These are 
important results, since other government expenditures besides pension costs (eg 
health care costs) are expected to increase, when population ages. And there 
seems to be also pressure to increase different taxes. Of course, one should note 
that all economies are not necessarily operating at or even close to the maximum 
sustainable expenditures. But many contemporary aging economies will easily 
approach the limits, if their expenditures increase enough. 
  Furthermore, if two economies differ only with respect to their population 
growth rates, the ratio of their maximum sustainable expenditures ( j i g / g)  i s  
directly proportional to their ratios of the gross population growth rates ( j i n / n) .  
Eg suppose that there is one percent difference in the annual gross growth rates 
such that  01 . 1 n
a
i =  and  02 . 1 n
a
j =  (superscript a refers to annual). Assuming that 
one period in the model is thirty years we get  74 . 8114 . 1 / 3478 . 1 g / g j i = = , which 
means that the maximum sustainable expenditures in the economy with slower 
population growth are about three fourths of that of the faster growing economy. 
  Now I consider an example, where pensions depend on income, ie an example 
with replacement. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, p. 40) report that the replacement 
rates have increased in many Western countries since the 1930’s from below 20 
per cent to even more than 60 per cent. The replacement rate is denoted by θ. It is 
the share of income a worker gets as a pension. In the first case pension in 
retirement will be a fraction θ of the working period’s real income (wage). This 
case has been studied in OG models also by Abel (2003) and in a different manner 
by Diamond (1997). 




t h ) 1 ( s τ − τ − =  (5.9i) 
 
t 1 t t 1 t
t
2 h R s R c θ + = + +  (5.9ii) 
 
Note that before tax purchasing power of the wage (ie the real wage income) is 
Rt+1ht in retirement. From the budget constraints it is quite easy to see that the 
level of θ does not affect anything in the economy. This is due to the fact that this 
type of replacement rule essentially guarantees the same return as what the 
consumer gets by voluntarily investing in the government bond. The optimal  
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behavior is  ) 1 ( R h 1 t t θ + τ − β = +  and  ) 1 )( 1 ( R s 1 t t τ − θ + τ − β = + . Government’s 










t h n h R n g n d n D τ − θ + = ≡ −







g d τ −
θ
+ = −  (5.10ii) 
 












g b − − + τ −
θ
+ =  (5.11) 
 
After a little manipulation we end up with the following equilibrium relation for 


















+ τ − =  (5.12) 
 
from where we easily conclude that the replacement rate does not affect the 
behavior of debt over time. 
  The second case, studied here, is the one, where pension is computed from the 
wage prevailing in the retirement period. This case has been studied eg by Bohn 




t h ) 1 ( s τ − τ − =  (5.13i) 
 
1 t t 1 t
t
2 h s R c + + θ + =  (5.13ii) 
 
The optimal behavior is  ) 1 ( R h 1 t t τ − β = +  and 
2
1 t t ) 1 ( R s τ − β = + . The primary 






t t h h h
n
g d τ − τ −
θ
+ =  (5.14) 
 
Pensions are financed by particular payroll taxes, ie  t
p
t h n h τ = θ . We consider the 
replacement rate as a policy variable. Then the social security tax rate, τ
p, must 
adjust to reflect possible changes in θ. Government’s intertemporal budget 










h g b − + τ − =  (5.15) 
 
Constructing again the reflected generational offer curve we get the following 
equilibrium representation for debt 
 
2
1 t p p t b














=  (5.16) 
 
Considering the fact that 
p nτ = θ  we re-express the equilibrium relation (5.11) as 
 
2
1 t t b














=  (5.17) 
 
Steady state requires that  0 ng ) 1 ( b ) n )( 1 ( b
2 2 = β τ − + θ − τ − β − . Solving the 
quadratic we get 
 




2 2 2 2 τ − β − β τ − θ − ± β θ − τ − =  (5.18) 
 
The real solutions exist for all government expenditures such that 
0 g ) 1 ( n 4 ) 1 ( ) n (
2 2 2 2 ≥ τ − β − β τ − θ − . Thus the maximum sustainable government 
expenditures are  n 4 / ) n ( g
2β θ − = . We conclude that g  is smaller the smaller is 
the population growth rate, and in particular, the higher the replacement rate the 
lower is the level of the maximum sustainable government expenditure consistent 
with equilibrium. 
  Again, if two economies differ only with respect to their population growth 
rates, the ratio of their maximum sustainable expenditures ( j i g / g ) is not directly 





i j i n ) n /( n ) n ( g / g θ − θ − = . Suppose again that  01 . 1 n
a
i =  and  02 . 1 n
a
j = , and 
in addition assume  3 / 2 = θ . The last assumption seems to be quite realistic (see 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, p. 40)). Assuming one period to be thirty years we 
get  4758 . 3478 . 1 ) 6667 . 8114 . 1 /( 8114 . 1 ) 6667 . 3478 . 1 ( g / g
2 2
j i = − − = . This means 
that the maximum sustainable expenditures in the economy with slower 
population growth are about half of that of the faster growing economy. It seems 
that inclusion of replacement will substantially decrease the ratio of sustainable 
deficits. 
  Next I will briefly study the robustness of these results. Although the above 
examples might seem to be even naively simple, it is actually the case that with 
rather general preferences the reflected generational offer curves have the convex  
19 
shape I have drawn above in Figure 2.
8 And thus the results on the sustainability 
of the fiscal policies presented in these examples seem to be more general than 
what one would believe based on these examples alone. 
 
 
6  The sustainability again: a more general case 
The preferences are now assumed to be 
 






1 − α + β =  (6.1) 
 
The budget constraints are as above in (5.2i) and (5.2ii). Since labor supply in this 
specification has an upper bound of unity, it is worthwhile to note that the 
maximum amount of saving (and indeed government debt in equilibrium) is  τ − 1 . 
Labor supply is now 
 
) 1 ( R
1 h
1 t






Solving the interest factor from (6.2) we get 
 




− − τ − β
α
=  (6.3) 
 
The reflected generational offer curve can now be expressed as 
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By computing I get 
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) b 1 (
n 1
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And the second derivative is 
                                                 
8 For elaborations see Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1979) and several chapters in Azariadis (1993). As 
Cass, Okuno and Zilcha point out, offer curves can have almost any shape, if there is a lot of 




































Thus the reflected generational offer curve is a strictly convex function of debt. 
And furthermore, to have a possibility for positive levels of debt, we need to 
assume that the slope of the offer curve at the origin is less than unity, ie we need 
a condition  1 n ) 1 /(
p < β τ − α . Using again the terminology in Gale (1973) this is 
essentially the condition for the Samuelson case, which is needed for equilibria 
with positive levels of debt. 
  To find out the maximum sustainable level of expenditures I set the slope of 
the offer curve to be unity, since there must be only one level of debt, which is 
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n 1
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) 1 ( n
1 ) 1 ( b p  (6.8) 
 
Since debt can be at most  τ − 1 , we choose the smaller value. We plug this value 
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− τ − =  (6.10) 
  
21 
Thus g  is smaller the smaller is the population growth rate. And furthermore, the 
higher the social security tax rate the lower is the level of the maximum 
sustainable government expenditure consistent with equilibrium. 
  Now the ratio of the maximum sustainable expenditures ( j i g / g ) is again not 
directly proportional to the ratios of the gross population growth rates. To be able 
to make the comparison we need to pick a value for the preference parameter, α. 
We assume again that  01 . 1 n
a
i =  and  02 . 1 n
a
j = , and in addition that  2 / 1 = β , and 
10 / 1
p = τ .
9 Since α is a preference parameter, we need to calibrate it. The labor 
supply in equilibrium is  ) 1 ( n / 1 h
p τ − β α − = . This should be roughly one 
third, since that is the approximate time used for productive purposes. McGrattan 
and Rogerson (2004) report that the average weekly hours worked have stayed 
around 40 per worker since 1950. We see that hours depend on the rate of 
population growth. For  01 . 1 n
a
i =  and  02 . 1 n
a
j =  the respective preference 
parameters will be  5192 . i = α  and 60189 . j = α . I use the average of these, .56054, 
in my computations. The ratio of expenditures is now 
2 2
j i ) 10762 . 1 1 /( ) 28402 . 1 1 ( g / g α − α − = , which will yield  05127 . g / g j i = . 
This is a strikingly small number, which means that the maximum sustainable 
expenditures in the economy with slower population growth are about five percent 
of the faster growing economy. 
  Pensions with replacement are  t
p
t h n h τ = θ . The equilibrium reflected 
generational offer curve is now 
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Choosing again the smaller value we end up with the following implicit equation 
for the maximum expenditures 
 
                                                 
9 If one period is thirty years, the discount factor of one half corresponds to the annual discount 













































1 ) 1 (  (6.13) 
 





















= τ −  (6.14) 
 
Thus again g  is smaller the smaller is the population growth rate. And 
furthermore, the higher the replacement rate the lower is the level of the 
maximum sustainable government expenditure consistent with equilibrium. 
  Since the labor hours in equilibrium are  ) n ( / 1 h θ − β α − = , we set them 
equal to one third and get the expenditure ratio as  i j j i j i n ) n /( n ) n ( g / g θ − θ − = . 
Assuming the replacement rate to be one half we get 
= = − − = 76751 . 1 / 53576 . 1 34785 . 1 ) 5 . 81136 . 1 /( 81136 . 1 ) 5 . 34785 . 1 ( g / g j i .86888. 
This means that the maximum sustainable expenditures in the economy with 




7  Taxes and labor supply 
It is often claimed that tax rates should be increased when population ages. The 
total taxes are  ) ( h T τ τ = . When the tax rate changes there is a corresponding 


































 is larger than unity. 















Since the hours of work are assumed to be one third we can easily compute that 
α = τ − β ) 2 / 3 ( ) 1 ( R . This means that the elasticity equals  ) 1 /( 2 τ − τ . This number 
is greater than unity for all tax rates which exceed one third. Practically in every 
Western market economy the tax rate (including all taxes) exceeds that number. 
From this perspective it is not clear that a plan to increase taxes can be a part of 




Utilizing two-period overlapping generations models it has been shown that the 
effects of aging on the sustainability of fiscal policy are robust, and in many 
examples rather worrisome for beliefs about the power of expansive fiscal policy 
to solve the problems of aging. With pay-as-you-go pension system a drop in the 
growth rate of population decreases the maximum level of sustainable deficits. If 
pensions depend on income (replacement) prevailing in the working period, 
increases in the replacement rate do not have any effect on equilibrium. If on the 
other hand pension depends on the wage prevailing in the retirement period an 
increase in the replacement rate lowers the level of maximum sustainable deficit. 
  Numerical examples with two economies differing only with respect to their 
population growth rates show that with pay-as-you-go system the ratio of the 
maximum sustainable deficits of these two economies is directly proportional to 
the ratio of their population growth rates. Comparison with replacement gives the 
value of that ratio about half. In the more general version of the model the ratio 
without replacement is only about five percent, and with replacement almost 
ninety percent. 
  With the labor supply specification of the more general model the elasticity of 
supply with respect to the tax rate is greater than unity for all tax rates which 
exceed one third. So it is not clear at all that plans to increase taxes can be a part 
of the solution to the aging problem in many Western market economies. 
  Perhaps an important missing element in the model is the fact that consumer-
workers cannot choose the exact time of their retirement. If they live longer than 
expected they might want to defer their retirement date. The possibility of that 
decision might alleviate the problems we have discussed above. But it bears 
emphasizing that many prevailing institutional restrictions (eg mandatory 
retirement age) do not really let workers to choose their retirement age in any 
case. A model along the lines of Sheshinski (1978) and Michel and Pestieau 
(2003) could be helpful in developing an OG model with voluntary retirement.  
24 
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